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Abstract Bioethics traffics in matters moral. As such, bioeth-
ics frequently bumps up against religion, offering an ideal
arena to examine how the sacred and the secular encounter
each other in modern medicine. In this essay I consider two
places where bioethics and religion intersect: 1) the response
of bioethics to the universal problem of suffering, and 2) the
professional proselytizing or “missionizing work” that bioeth-
ics does in order to make a place for itself among the profes-
sions of the life sciences.
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I hate, I despise your religious festivals;
your assemblies are a stench to me.
Even though you bring me burnt offerings and grain
offerings,
I will not accept them.
Though you bring choice fellowship offerings,
I will have no regard for them.
Away with the noise of your songs!
I will not listen to the music of your harps.
But let justice roll on like a river, righteousness like a
never-failing stream!
Amos 5: 21–24
I have a small poster on the door of my office that offers a
concise illustration of the relationship between science and the
humanities. It shows a scientist, clad in white lab coat,
watching as a very large egg cracks open. His arms are raised
above his head in celebration. The text reads: “Science can tell
you how to clone a tyrannosaurus rex”. Immediately below is
a second image: the same scientist running from the now full-
grown, fearsome dinosaur. Here the text reads: “Humanities
can tell you why this may be a bad idea”. Perhaps a bit sim-
plistic, but it captures the tension between the sacred and the
secular that we find in the modern hospital. The myriad tech-
nologies that populate the clinic – all of which are capable of
altering the natural processes of birth, illness, and death –
create questions about their proper application, questions that
cannot be answered by the secular and rational logic that built
these technologies.
Where do we go for guidance about how to use the tech-
nologies of medicine? That depends, in large part, on who the
“we” is. If the “we” includes those who agree on a set of moral
principles and on the source of those principles, the answer is
relatively simple. There may well be disagreement on how to
apply those agreed-upon principles, but at a minimum the
decision about where to begin has been made.
But if the “we” encompasses a collection of folks whose
moralities begin in different places and generate a variety of
moral principles, agreeing on the right thing to do will be no
easy task. Sorting right from wrong in this situation forces us
to notice the relationship between cosmology and morality, to
ponder the nature of the moral authority – if any – we are
willing to submit to. As societies move from religious to sci-
entific cosmologies, moral authority moves from the sacred to
the rational. But this move is never complete. Logical and
empirical explanations of why something is moral or immoral
cannot fully encompass questions of meaning that are part of
ethical decision-making. For example, medical-scientific
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evidence about the viability of a 20-week-old fetus gives no
counsel about whether that fetus is a human being or merely a
proto-human, a “product of conception”.
Enter bioethics. Bioethics was born in a context character-
ized by moral pluralism and shifting ideas about the nature of
moral authority; it was, and is, an effort to develop a set of
principles and a method for moral decision-making acceptable
to all, regardless of one’s religion or ideology. Given its mis-
sion to bring a secular morality to medicine and the life sci-
ences – where ethical questions about the boundaries and
meaning of life abound – bioethics finds itself constantly
bumping up against religion. These encounters are challeng-
ing because they highlight an essential tension in the precepts
of bioethics. Foundational to the field is “respect for persons”,
a precept that demands that religious beliefs not be dismissed
as merely collections of irrational myths. At the same time, the
bioethical precept of universalism makes it impossible to in-
clude religion as a serious element in moral decision-making.
As a consequence, bioethics compartmentalizes religion. Yes,
religion has some limited moral legitimacy, appropriate for
certain groups and individuals, but it has no claim on broader
moral theory. Thus religion is ghettoized: we have, for exam-
ple, Catholic bioethics, Jewish bioethics, and Islamic
bioethics.
This unique tension makes bioethics an ideal arena to ex-
plore how the sacred and the secular encounter each other in
modern medicine and medical research. I am particularly in-
terested in two of the many places where bioethics brushes up
against religion. The first has to do with the sociology of
bioethical knowledge: how bioethics approaches and re-
sponds to the universal problem of suffering. The second is
“professional proselytizing”: the “missionizing work” that
bioethics does in order to make a place for itself among the
professions of the life sciences. In both cases I consider how
the secular stance of bioethics limits its ability to fully respond
to the challenging existential and moral questions that emerge
in medicine and medical research.1
While interest in the ethics of medicine is as old as the healing
arts themselves, bioethics is, as noted above, a relatively re-
cent field of inquiry and practice. There are varied accounts of
the conditions that generated the move from medical ethics to
bioethics, but common to all is concern with the unnecessary
suffering of research subjects and patients. These histories
reference the harmful experiments conducted on humans
without their consent during World War II (notably by
the Germans, but also by the Japanese and the Ameri-
cans), the use of poor people and minorities in medical
research,2,3 and the tough choices that had to be made
when kidney dialysis was new and available only to a
few.4
It is, in fact, fair to say that bioethics was born because of
this deep concern with human suffering. Remarkably, in spite
of this foundational disquiet, the field has spent very little
intellectual energy on responses to suffering. As the secular
voice of moral decision making, bioethics has ceded inquiries
on the nature and meaning of suffering to religion. Anthropol-
ogist Arthur Kleinman comments:
One is surprised to find so many professional ethical
volumes in which [the word suffering] does not appear
as an entry in the index. Ethical systems that leave the
problem of suffering (and related concepts of endurance
and courage) to particular theological traditions cannot
adequately engage the human core of illness and care.5
Two features of bioethics are resposible for this bioethical
ignorance of suffering. First, as John Evans points out in his
book Playing God, the field has moved from “thick” to “thin”
bioethics.6 In the early days of the field, bioethicists were
concerned with “thick”, substantive questions about the mean-
ing of human life and the effect of new technologies on what it
means to be human. The search for answers to these questions
drew on theological and philosophical insights. As the field
developed, the questions that interested bioethicists became
much “thinner” and more formal. No longer was there a con-
cern with ends, the interest shifted to means – that is, how to
design guidelines and regulations that would protect patients
and research subjects. Bioethicists became consultants, edu-
cators, and guides seeking bureaucratic solutions for bioethi-
cal problems. This new “thin” approach provides no space to
explore the meaning of suffering. Contemporary bioethics has
nothing to say when those who suffer need help in making
sense of their experience.
A second reason that bioethics gave up on suffering is that
the field has become closely associated with medicine.
Kleinman observes:
Like biomedicine, bioethics begins with professional
definitions of pathology. The experience of illness is
made over, through the application of ethical abstrac-
tions into a contextless philosophical construct that is
every bit as professionally centered and divorced from
1 The following two sections are based on earlier work on these topics





5 Kleinman 1997: 50.
6 Evans 2001.
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Secular Bioethics and the Response to Suffering
patients’ suffering as is the biomedical construction of
disease pathology.7
He goes on to say:
… [the] standard version of bioethics shares yet another
biomedical bias, the rejection of teleology. Biomedicine
banishes the concepts of purpose and ultimate meaning
to religion; yet most patients and practitioners struggle
to make sense of illness with respect to great cultural
codes that offer coherent interpretations of experience.8
By giving up on meaning and teleology, bioethics misses
what we might call ‘the paradox of suffering’. Cassell has
defined this paradox well:
…suffering also reveals to the sufferer a greater depth of
human experience and meaning. After the experience of
suffering, the person is led to a richer understanding of
the meaning of being human, a greater concern for the
suffering of others, and away from the superficialities
that too often characterize daily existence.9
What does bioethics lose when it ignores the paradox
of suffering? In his book, Lost in the Cosmos: The Last
Self-Help Book, American novelist and essayist, Walker
Percy, offers an answer. In one of several anecdotes, he
describes an ordinary morning when a businessman
goes out to retrieve the morning paper. He is suffering
from anxiety and concerned about a presentation he
must make later in the day, and in a bizzare twist, an
insane young man drives by and shoots him with a .22
caliber pistol. The wound is not fatal, but as this busi-
nessman waits for the ambulance, he notices how well
the dogwood he planted 10 years ago is doing; in the
hospital he jokes with the doctors, quoting Churchill
who said: “Nothing makes a man feel better than to
be shot without effect.” Percy then asks his readers,
“Is this occurrence:
(a) Unrelievedly bad news? It is not good to get shot. One
could die of it.
(b) Putatively bad news but secretly good? The incident
somehow dispenses you. The single irrational act of a
madman changes the entire state of your life in an instant
– from that of an anxious worried businessman in danger
of losing a big account, to that of an innocent victim, not
only not guilty, but also unfailed…”10
Percy uses this story to reveal one of the possibilities of
suffering: Suffering takes us out of our ordinary lives and
makes us aware of things going on about us that do not nor-
mally get noticed.
Given its thin and non-teleological approach to affairs med-
ical, bioethics is unable to provide this type of insight to those
who suffer. Bioethics consultations are limited to resolving
questions about “morally appropriate” care. Efforts to make
sense of the illness experience are necessarily excluded.
Looking more deeply into the paradox of suffering, we
discover that the experience opens up three distinct possibili-
ties. First, suffering creates community. It is in suffering that
we discover what we share with our fellow humans.
Neiderauer makes this observation:
In human suffering the believer sees the grounds of our
common humanity, recognizing that it is through suffer-
ing, above all, that human beings are stirred to the love
of one another… 11
In his book, The Wounded Healer, Henri Nouwen picks up
on this theme. He points out that being wounded allows the
healer – be that a minister, a physician, or a bioethicist – to
show true hospitality. He says there is more to being a wound-
ed healer than just spiritual exhibitionism, or the sharing of
superficial personal pains. He sees in the wounds that the
healer brings with him or her “a constant willingness to see
one’s own pain and suffering as rising from the depths of the
human condition which we all share.” In this way, suffering
frees us from ourselves, from our illusions of immortality and
illusions of wholeness.Whenwe are freed from these illusions
and from ourselves we can truly welcome the “other” and be
authentically hospitable.12
Second, suffering also can lead to resistance. The sufferer
is separated from the world that has pushed this person in
directions that run counter to true human need. Kleinman
explains:
Take, for example, consumer society. I can’t tell you
how many patients I’ve sat with who had terrible can-
cers or other life-threatening problems who’ve said to
me, “You know, one of the things about this disease is
it’s really made me rethink how I live my life.” That’s a
kind of protest, a resistance to the way the world is that
comes out of that encounter.13
James Hillman agrees. He believes that suffering creates
the possibility of revolution. He says, “The real revolution in
our society begins with a person who can stand with his own
7 Kleinman 1995: 1670.
8 Kleinman 1997: 50.
9 Cassell 2004: 32.
10 Percy 1983: 62–63.
11 Niederauer 2007.
12 Nouwen 1979.
13 Kleinman 2006: 88.
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depression, because then you say, ‘No!’ to the whole manic
situation of modern society – over-consumption, over-activity,
travel.”14
Third, suffering can be regarded as a quest. Arthur Frank,
who has written much about suffering from the point of view
of sociology, finds three ways that people approach suffer-
ing.15 One is to stay put in their suffering, which he defines
as chaos – “living among the broken integrity of the person.”
A second approach is to go backward, that is, to reconsider
your life, thinking about events that you now regret, thinking
about ways to repair those regrets, to engage in restitution and
undo the wrongs you have done. The third response to suffer-
ing is to go forward and to see suffering as a quest, opening up
new possibilities in life, taking people to new places where
they had not been before.
This point of view about suffering is well illustrated in
Flannery O’Connor’s short story, “A Good Man is Hard to
Find.” The story begins as a family is preparing for a trip to
Florida. Things are typically hectic, complicated by the fact
that “grandmother”, the classic mother-in-law, does not want
to go. In an effort to get her way, she picks up the paper and
reads aloud about the “Misfit”, who has just escaped from the
Federal Pen and is “headed toward Florida”. The Misfit is a
terrible man who kills without mercy – a one-man machine of
pointless suffering. If you know the work of O’Connor, de-
vout Catholic from the American South, you know that men-
tion of the trip to Florida and an escaped criminal guarantees a
fateful meeting.
The family finally gets out the door and the grandmother
continues to nag, insisting they take a detour to see an old
plantation house with a fascinating ‘secret panel’. Dad was
not inclined, but the children took up the cause, screaming
that they wanted to see the secret panel. Being a good father,
he gives in and heads off down the dirt road that the grand-
mother is sure will take them to the house with the secret
panel.
You can guess the rest. The family cat – Pitty Sing – es-
capes from her basket and startles the dad who rolls the car
into a ditch. As they get out of the car, checking themselves for
injury, who should appear from the woods? The details are
classic O’Connor. The Misfit and his accomplices dispatch
dad, mom, and the kids, leaving the grandmother to plead
for her life:
The misfit’s voice seemed about to crack and the grand-
mother’s head cleared for an instant. She saw the man’s
face twisted close to her own as if he were going to cry
and she murmured, “Why you’re one of my babies.
You’re one of my own children!” She reached out and
touched him on the shoulder. The misfit sprang back as
if a snake had bitten him and shot her three times
through the chest. Then he put his gun down on the
ground and took off his glasses and began to clean them.
One of his accomplices comments: “She sure was a talker,
wasn’t she?” The misfit replies: “She would of been a good
woman, if it had been somebody there to shoot her every
minute of her life.”16 Suffering can be seen as the experience
that is there to shoot us every minute of our lives.
Cassell summarizes this for us:
Both on a religious and a secular basis, it is not unusual
for suffering persons to believe that their suffering is a
form of selfless service to others. Through the acquisi-
tion of meaning in this fashion, the suffering is
alleviated.17
The commitment of bioethics to be the secular approach to
moral decision-making has weakened the ability of the field to
respond to (inevitable) suffering and to fully appreciate the
ethical aspects of illness and its treatment. What would bio-
ethics look like if it was not cocooned in its secular space?
Integration with religion would allow bioethics to move from
the realm of the extraordinary to the ordinary, to consider the
inevitable, everyday, ordinary problems of living and to see
the need to see the need to respond to those problems as part of
the moral responsibility of the medical community. In
overlooking the universality of suffering, bioethics misses
the opportunity to engage in a deeper understanding of who
we are as humans – an understanding essential to moral foun-
dations of medicine. Exploring suffering can tell us something
about the nature of persons, the relationship between persons
and their bodies, the goals of medicine, the relationship be-
tween persons and their communities, and the place of the
spirit in the lives of individuals.
As a secular, rational endeavor, bioethics resists the religious.
But, interestingly, in its efforts to establish its place in medi-
cine and the life sciences, bioethics calls on proselytizing
methods commonly associated with religious missionizing.
Like Christian missionaries who left Europe and North Amer-
ica to witness to peoples in other lands, bioethicists are now
bringing the gospel – the “good news” – to those in low and
middle income countries.
The Christian gospel is the New Testament story of salva-
tion found in the birth, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
14 Hillman 1983: 12.
15 Frank 1995.
16 O’Connor 1983.
17 Cassell 1995: 1961–1969.
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Spreading the Word: the “Good News” of Bioethics
The gospel of bioethics is “good clinical practice”, the Bel-
mont Report,18 and the Declaration of Helsinki.19 Both mis-
sionaries and bioethicists may object to this comparison. Mis-
sionaries will point out that they are devoted to a spiritual task,
not to the secular work of developing regulations and
guidelines for the practice of medicine and medical re-
search. For their part, bioethicists will likely resent be-
ing described with a term associated—in their minds, at
least—with those who destroyed local cultures and
paved the way for colonial abuses. These objections
are, of course, based on stereotypes. Not all missionar-
ies are tools of imperialistic nations, and most do more
than care for the souls of those they minister to. And
while it is true that bioethicists help to create and write
regulations, their ultimate goal is to protect patients and
research subjects from harm and exploitation.
Nevertheless, the metaphor of missionary work is useful
for understanding how bioethics has insinuated itself in the
developing world, making visible interesting similarities in
the work of missionaries and bioethicists. For instance, it is
clear that bioethicists have followed—consciously or uncon-
sciously—one important example from the missionary move-
ment. Like missionaries before them, bioethicists are shifting
from “imported” to “indigenous” evangelization.20 Beginning
in the mid-nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth
century, missionaries faced resistance from their host
countries. In some places, most notably China, mission-
aries were expelled; in other places, missionaries were
increasingly regarded as colonialists. Mission organiza-
tions responded to this turn of events with the notion of
“indigenization.” No longer would missionaries from the
West be exported to other countries. Instead, citizens
from those countries would be brought to the West
and trained to situate the missionary message in the
local culture. This meant translating the gospel into lo-
cal languages, using local organizational forms in the
creation of churches and adapting local customs to the
teaching of the gospel. Over time, indigenization came
to be called “contextualization”, and it was described as
an effort to protect, and be relevant in, local culture.
Although they do not use the term, those in the West who
wish to bring the benefit of bioethics to the developing world
have seen the value of indigenization. Indigenization is a so-
lution to what Solomon describes as the “export problem” of
Western bioethics—a problem that is unavoidable when
bioethics, a creation ofWestern culture, collides with the systems
of ethics found in local, non-Western cultures.21 Pursuing the
indigenization solution, bioethicists from the developing world
are currently being trained in the United States (via the Fogarty
International Center of the National Institutes of Health22), Eu-
rope (via the Erasmus Mundus Masters program in bioeth-
ics23), and the United Kingdom (via The Wellcome Trust24).
Having learned the language and logic of Western bioethics,
trainees return to their home countries to spread the “gospel”.
What dowe know about the “success” of the indigenization
of bioethics? Research addressing and/or evaluating these spe-
cific training programs has been scant, and the descriptions
and evaluations that do exist tend to be programmatic (i.e.,
“Did wemeet the goals of the funder?”) rather than critical and
reflective (“Have our bioethics programs helped local norms
and values to be realized?”).
From Noble Intent to Unwitting Harm
For the most part, the desire to spread the gospel, Christian or
bioethical, begins with noble intent—the goal is to bring the
benefits of developments in one part of the world to another
part of the world where those benefits are not experienced or
understood. Those benefits may be eschatological or existen-
tial, but in either case, the motivation is to proffer aid and share
lessons learned. But, as we have seen in some of the transac-
tions between missionaries/bioethicists and the people they
serve, noble intent is not sufficient to bring good results. An
imbalance in power between would-be helpers and those to be
helped creates a one-way flow of influence from “missionaries”
to “locals” that not only diminishes the possibility of mutual
enrichment, but also creates the possibility of unwitting harm.
An evaluation of a research ethics training workshop at a
Nigerian university implicitly illustrates the problem of one-
way flow of influence. The authors begin their report by not-
ing that “training in research ethics affords scientists, especial-
ly those from developing countries, the opportunity to contrib-
ute to ever increasing international debates on ethical issues. .
.” Indeed, “international debates on ethical issues” should
be informed by insights of those in the developing world.
But just a few pages later, we learn what the program
actually accomplished: “Post-training improvements were
found in participants’ knowledge of the principles of re-
search, the application of these principles, the internation-
al regulations, and the operations of an IRB”.25 Measured
18 Available at: http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/
belmont.htm.
19 Current version available at: http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/
10policies/b3/index.html
20 See http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/I54ME.html for a
brief description of the indigenization movement in mission work from
a Mennonite point of view.
21 Solomon (2006: 337) outlines three different forms of the export prob-






25 Ajuwon and Kass 2008: 2,8.
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by its own evaluation metric, this program was focused on
teaching Nigerians the wisdom of Western bioethics
(“principles, the international regulations, and the opera-
tions of an IRB”), not on seeking wisdom from the tradi-
tions of Nigeria.
Arguing from a natural law perspective, Boyle points out:
…fragmentation of the pursuits of health around the
world implies that no authority within any health care
or biomedical community such as a medical association
or expert group [can] qualify as having global bioethical
authority. . . [U]ntil the world is much more integrated
and unified, there will be no properly bioethical legisla-
ture or Supreme Court for the whole world.26
We know that religious, legal, psychological, historical,
and ethical differences have an impact on bioethical views
both within and between countries27 but this seemingly obvi-
ous fact gets lost in many ethics training programs in devel-
oping countries. Benatar, a bioethicist from South Africa,
chides those from the West who would “improve” the ethics
of countries in the developing world:
What should be avoided is the previous colonial men-
tality of wanting to study and improve others while
oblivious of the need to address the more sophisticated
and covert faults of Western researchers’ own societies.
The desire to improve the behavior of others should also
be associated with awareness that one’s own exemplary
moral behavior might be more effective in promoting
ethical behavior and respect for human rights than […]
attempts to change the cultural attitudes of others while
neglecting our own adverse cultural attitudes.28
The Inside View of Indigenization:
Bioethicists-in-Training Speak
Interviews with 21 trainees at a European-based bioeth-
ics program, described elsewhere,29 shed light on sever-
al important things about efforts to indigenize bioethics.
Here I briefly review three of these: (1) problems with
the sources of, and models of, ethical reasoning; (2) a
lack of fit between the ethical issues taught in classes
and the ethical problems in the students’ home coun-
tries; and (3) the motivation(s) for establishing Western
bioethics in the developing world.
Sources and Models of Ethical Reasoning
A majority of the students in this training program came from
parts of the world where Christianity was not the dominant
religion. And yet, in Europe, reasoning about ethical issues is
deeply rooted in the Christian tradition and Christian scholar-
ship of the West. Students were aware of this and felt a degree
of disconnect with their own histories. A student from China
pointed out:
“…if I want to accept all of the theologies and, too, the
methods for the bioethics for Chinese people, it’s a little
bit difficult …in China, we have different religions…
and very few people believe inGod…they are not Chris-
tian…so they have no sort of knowledge about Christian
history, about Jesus, so you know, a lot of bioethics,
methods, and theories came from Jesus…”
Students admitted that much of their own exposure to
ethics and bioethics, before their arrival in Europe, came from
the West. This is to be expected, given that the overwhelming
majority of published knowledge about ethics—in books, ref-
erence works, and on the Internet—comes from Europe and
North America.
One student pointed out that training in the Western way of
bioethics is “interesting,” but the model of ethical reasoning
that is almost universally taught—principlism—is not an easy
fit in most developing countries.
Based on the well-known four principles—autonomy, be-
neficence, nonmaleficence, and justice—principlism is easily
taught and applied to a wide variety of ethical dilemmas, at
least in societies where these principles fit seamlessly with
cultural values. It can be argued that the four principles are
sufficiently abstract allowing them to float above, and yet
account for, the peculiarities of culture. This line of argument
suggests that regardless of our cultural differences, we all can
agree that nonmaleficence is a good thing. But, of course, we
must hasten to add that what you and I call “harm” may vary.
And the same can be said of autonomy: in the United States,
autonomy is conceived in a radically individualist manner, but
in other cultures we can adjust the idea to incorporate more
familial and communal ideas of autonomy. In the atomistic
United States, a free and independent individual should
(must?) determine her care, whereas in more communal soci-
eties, autonomous decisions occur in consultation with, or by
decision of, recognized authorities.
Ultimately, this argument is specious. Pushed too far in this
direction the principles become meaningless. Can we really
speak of autonomy if others make a treatment decision for an
adult woman? Bioethics students from the developing world
saw several problems with the principlist approach they were
learning. Not surprisingly, the principle of autonomy was
identified as most problematic. Many of the students saw a
26 Boyle 2006: 321.
27 Bayertz 2006: 220–223.
28 Benatar 2005.
29 De Vries et al. 2011.
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disjuncture between their cultural values and the individual-
ism implicit in autonomy. A student from a Muslim country
noted: “…in [Islam]…justice [is more important] than auton-
omy…Islam said first your neighborhood…not first
yourself.”
Another discussed a Buddhist view:
“…[an author I am reading] argues that in Buddhism
you have no concept of autonomy. …She said that the
central concept is compassion, and it emphasized pater-
nalism. So for myself, this is what I think for myself,
compassionate paternalism, it’s not that bad.”
From India:
“[In rural India] their idea of autonomy is totally differ-
ent, like they’re not, even for signing our hospital ad-
mission sheet, it is not a patient or immediate person, it
is…the family [that] was signing for that patient, even
for admission, even for taking out of the hospital, it’s not
the patient who is signing…we are not thinking the au-
tonomy of the person, we are thinking about the collec-
tive autonomy of the whole family.”
Ethical Issues Here and There
Training in bioethics typically involves review of ethical
theories (described above) and in-depth discussion of
critical ethical issues. These discussions offer the oppor-
tunity to apply ethical theory to real-life situations, and
allow students to practice the move from the theoretical
to the applied. What are the ethical issues covered in
coursework of students from the developing world?
Here are two course descriptions from the curriculum
of the students who were interviewed:
Ethics of Reproductive Technologies: The aim of this
course is to familiarize participants with an ethical ap-
proach of assisted reproduction. The goal is not only to
essentially inform the participants about the latest devel-
opments and challenges in this area of medicine, but also
to help them develop a critical and ethical clarification of
this subject. This course works from an interdisciplinary
(theological, legal, psychological, medical) perspective.
Human Genetics and Medical Technology: The course
aims to educate participants on a range of ethical subjects
that currently are the focus of debate in genetics. Teach-
ing will focus on the moral problems generated by the
Human Genome Project, as well as the ethical boundaries
in the clinical application of new knowledge in, for ex-
ample, genetic counseling, genetic screening, gene thera-
py, and cloning. The implications of scientific progress
for the image of the human being, as well as for modern
culture, will also be studied.
This curriculum is not atypical. Review of the course re-
quirements for those in the Johns Hopkins Fogarty African
Bioethics Training Program reveals a few more relevant-
sounding titles—for example, there is a “Short Course in In-
ternational Research Ethics”—but course content is equally
skewed toward Western ideas. The description of the Interna-
tional Research Ethics course reads: “Introduce trainees to the
major principles and theories ofWestern bioethics, to U.S. and
international guidelines that govern human participants re-
search”.30 An evaluation of the program suggests it has been
empowering to students but, significantly, also indicates that
the training is still too Western-centric, lacking in curricula
more appropriate to developing countries.31
Students in the European program noticed this lack of fit.
At one point, students from the program approached the fac-
ulty about making the coursework more relevant to conditions
in their home countries. As one student explains, they were
rebuffed:
“…would you like to know what was a surprising thing
for me? That when we were talking about adjusting this
program to the need not just to talk about the [European]
situation, but a little bit wider, and people from India
were highly interested to talk about HIV…the reaction
was, ‘but we are a European course.’”
Students also felt that the assigned readings were not
aligned with what they would need to know when they
returned home. One student talked about the need to learn
the basics, even if she did not know “who Levinas is:”
“… for me, it is sometimes too much, too many terms,
not the right context, and I will prefer to debate, to talk,
to share something like that, because it is the way I learn
better, rather than just to have a philosopher who is
using a very specific language.”
Motivations: Why Teach Western Bioethics to Students
from the Developing World?
Given the lack of fit between the content of training programs
in bioethics and the bioethical situation and needs of countries
in the developing world, it is reasonable to ask “Why do these
programs exist?” The answer to that question is not simple. In
our search for an answer, we look to both what we learned
from students and to campaigns by for-profit organizations
30 Hyder et al. 2007: 677.
31 Hyder et al. 2007: 675, 682; see also Marshall and Koenig 2004.
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marketing their clinical trial services. In her explanation of the
difference between medical ethics and bioethics, a student
from India reveals an important motivation for the export of
Western bioethics (emphasis added):
“Medical ethics was something like the ethics related to
clinical care and the doctor, how we should be with
patients and all that. That was what we were taught in
medical school… But now because research is coming
in a big way, especially with a lot of international col-
laborations, the U.S. ethos of bioethics is coming in a
big way.”
This student understands the current situation. As
Petryna has pointed out, the number of clinical trials
in the developing world has grown markedly over the
past 15 years, as pharmaceutical companies search for
“naïve bodies” (bodies that are not under the influence
of several drugs, as is the case in many Western na-
tions), and more favorable ethical environments.32
Students are aware of the need for better bioethics in the
developing world. In their comments on the coming of the
pharmaceutical industry to their countries, they demonstrate
a mix ofmotives for learning the ways ofWestern bioethics: to
protect the subjects of research but also to encourage econom-
ic development. This student from China was typical:
“No, just now, [we have] no formal [research ethics]
committees [in China], no, so it’s a big problem. I think
I like to come here and learn more knowledge about this
field, I want to do some work in this field… at least I can
help to organize the bioethical review communities in
my universities, for our country…I know doctors, they
do some clinical trials, they have no approval…they
didn’t do the informed consent…they didn’t have the
review…[from] the research review committees, so it’s
a big problem, they do some trials, it’s not good.”
She goes on to discuss the director’s enthusiasm for having
European-trained bioethicists in China:
“…my director, director of our institute, he’s very good
person and he has a lot of ideas for the future develop-
ment, and when he learned [that] I got [a] scholarship,
and of the European community, and I can come to
European countries to learn bioethics, he [was] very
excited. He said, ‘ahh it’s good, it’s good for you and
also for our institutions. I know in Europe the bioethics
have a very good…they pay a lot of attention in this
field and they have a lot of knowledge in this field and
I think you can learn a lot of things there.’”
Similarly, a student from an Eastern European coun-
try noted:
“…we have several IRBs registered, just because let’s
say our genetics center, probably 7, 8, 10 years ago,
became interested to work with some French orga-
nization and they, one of the requirements was:
‘where was your IRB?’ So these people started to
work on that…”
32 Petryna 2005. 33 McGinnis 2007: 401.
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Conclusion
Can the essential ideas and goals of a secular bioethics be
realized in culturally plural societies? What happens when
we are good without God? In its effort to avoid parochialism,
bioethics avoids exploring the meaning of illness, suffering,
and death. In its effort to protect the subjects of medicine and
medical research wherever they may be found, bioethics en-
gages in professional proselytizing, preaching the secular gos-
pel of ethical principles that transcend culture. The good news
offered by religions is replaced by a secular good news of
rules and regulations.
Bioethicists can succeed in their mission without becoming
evangelists if they look more closely at missionary history.
McGinnis points this out when he compares the indigenization
movement in Christian missions with a similar trend in efforts
to promote human rights:
…an essential ingredient in the missionary strategy of
evangelization is conspicuously absent in contemporary
programs of development, democratization, or peace-
building. In particular, the extensive efforts devoted by
Protestant missionaries to the translation of their Biblical
message into local languages and symbolic repertoires
bear little resemblance to efforts to transplant Western
ideals of universal human rights, or the institutional tem-
plates of democratic governance, first developed in the
United States and Western Europe.33
The effort to appreciate religious beliefs and local cul-
tural ideals is more than just a sign of respect for the
“clients” of bioethics. It also promises new ways of ap-
proaching the issues secular bioethicists confront. In their
discussion of the value of a “bioethics from below,”
Rennie and Mupenda suggest that “bioethics research
and scholarship [revolves] around issues that, while fasci-
nating and important, currently affect only a small minor-
ity of the world’s population” and argue for a move away
from “a ‘90/10’ gap, i.e., a situation where 90 % of
34 Rennie and Mupenda 2008.
35 Engelhardt 2006: 40.
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discussions on bioethics in the literature and the popular
media may revolve around issues affecting 10 % of the
world’s population.” They conclude with this interesting
comment on the value of two-way communication be-
tween Western bioethics and bioethics in the developing
world:
…greater attention to ethical issues arising from bio-
medical research, clinical practice and public health in-
terventions ‘far away’ might have a positive effect on
bioethics ‘closer to home,’ potentially expanding the
horizons of the field and enhancing its social
relevance.34
If they are willing to “thicken” their thinking about ethical
problems, secular bioethicists can learn a great deal from the
ethical traditions embedded in religions and found in the coun-
tries of the developing world. Like Christian missionaries who
discovered new things about God by listening to those they
hoped to convert, bioethicists will learn new things about
ethics by listening to religions and to those in the developing
world. Reflecting on the possibility of a global bioethics,
Engelhardt explains:
… global bioethics can at best provide a thin moral
framework, a space within which individual and moral
communities can peaceably pursue divergent under-
standings of morality and bioethics within limited de-
mocracies and within a global market. Such a global
bioethics cannot provide a content-full understanding
of the right, the good, virtue, or human flourishing. Con-
tent will have to be found within particular moral com-
munities and the moralities and bioethics they sustain.35
Bioethics has been unwilling to enrich its practice by
integrating ideas drawn from religious traditions and
from cultures different from the West. As we have seen,
there are historical and professional reasons for the
move from thick to thin bioethics, but with this move
bioethics misses the opportunity to enhance its own
moral practices and the moral practice of those who
have not given into secularization.
I opened this article with a passage from the Old Testament
book of the prophet Amos. When it encounters religious tra-
ditions, secular bioethics would do well to keep in mind the
voice of Amos, reminding them of the many ways the pursuit
of justice is hampered by clinging too tightly to one’s tradi-
tions and professional self interests. A more complex and
thoroughgoing rapprochement between secular and religious
approaches to moral decision-making is overdue.
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